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ABSTRACT 
Analysing interactions between regulators and regulated is a major research theme in 
risk management which is little explored, despite their assumed impact on the reliability of 
high-risk organisations. The question is particularly topical in the nuclear sector, which forms 
the basis of the research presented in this article. Several models of expertise and control 
activities taken from the scientific literature are presented before being compared with 
empirical data from research-intervention performed in conjunction with experts from the 
Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, specialists in human and 
organisational factors. The case studies show an expertise activity relatively remote from 
models presented previously, which take little account of the peculiarities of the system of 
relationships between the regulator and the regulated and do not place sufficient emphasis on 
the methods of constructing the bodies of knowledge of the expert assessment. Once the 
operations and products from the assessment process have been clarified, types of 
effectiveness are defined. These are used to suggest possible improvements and understand 
better the effects of an neglected activity. The results can seemingly be transposed to other 
institutional configurations and industrial sectors. 
                                                
1
 This paper presents the results of research carried out jointly by the Ecole Nationale 
Supérieure des Mines de Paris and the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear 
Safety (IRSN). 
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Researchers interested in high-risk organisations in recent years have often underlined 
the major impact of regulation modalities, of regulatory "styles" on the reliability and safety 
of facilities. The analysis of interactions between regulators and regulated is identified as a 
fertile research theme, especially by Mathilde Bourrier (2007) in a recent preliminary 
investigation: "hazardous plant regulation cannot be thought without the greatest attention 
being paid to the way in which regulated and regulators organise their interaction." (177); "it 
should be possible to include an understanding of the contribution made by control and 
expertise bodies to site safety in the programme of research into "creating" high risk and 
safety." (162) These aspects are also one possible extension to the work of Benoît Journé 
(1999; 2001) on managing the safety of nuclear power plants on a daily basis by the operating 
teams: "the analysis of the external control should be widened by direct observation of the 
operating mode of Safety Authorities." (1999)(418). 
Despite the academic interest in this topic, there is still little empirical research likely 
to characterise the regulator-regulated interactions, with a few exceptions (Bonnaud 2002; 
Dupré and Etienne 2007; Wilpert 2008). "Actors in administration on the edge of sites - 
inspection or governing authorities - have rarely been investigated" (Bourrier 2007)(162) and 
are among the "blind points" identified by Mathilde Bourrier. The same has also been noted 
on the other side of the Atlantic by representatives of the trend for high-reliability 
organisations (HRO) in connection with the control of nuclear facilities: "nuclear utility/NRC 
relationships have received little attention at the microlevel. Most studies of the NRC have 
focused on macro issues such as the politics of regulation and regulatory reform rather on 
case studies of the working relationships between plants and NRC inspectors." (La_Porte and 
Thomas 1995)(114) The control authorities are just as concerned by this problem as the 
bodies responsible for supplying them with expertise. Pierre-Benoît Joly (2005) notes in a 
review paper that recent research on expertise "finally says little (…) about the way the 
experts regulate their relationships with their colleagues and other risk management players 
(…)" (160). This is particularly topical in the nuclear sector; the nuclear safety expertise 
bodies were in fact the subject of a symposium in 2007 with some sixty countries represented. 
The event aimed to share good practices in organising expertise processes and establish 
universal principles, despite the widely varying institutional contexts
2
 likely to influence the 
                                                
2
 Take for example the differences in articles of association of these expertise-producing 
bodies. It can be the department of an administrative authority, like in the United States or 
Sweden, or an independent authority combining expertise and research activities like in 
France, Germany and Belgium (see Le_Déaut, J.-Y. (1998). Rapport sur le système français 
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type of regulator-regulated interaction and the action logics of experts. In vain. The 
presentations only established similarities at a relatively abstract level; speakers advocated 
respecting the traditional values of independence and transparency whereas the audience - 
which included the author - deplored the lack of detailed examples which could perhaps have 
identified truly good practices. 
The research presented in this article attempts to respond to these expectations, to 
unveil the wheels of a neglected activity, to highlight the logics of actors who noone could 
claim have any influence on the reliability of industrial facilities, but on which their 
recommendations continue to have an enigmatic effect. We shall therefore be led to qualify 
the regulator-regulated (expert-plant operator) interactions and identify their products and we 
shall ultimately attempt to provide answers to two questions: what are the elementary 
operations of the expertise production system? What is an effective expert assessment? 
The little empirical research into the operation of bodies producing expert safety 
assessments must not prevent us from drawing on the theoretical progress in management and 
social sciences nor discussing the widely-accepted, implicit representations of expertise, 
control and regulation activities
3
. Different activity models will therefore be presented. 
Researchers interested in industrial risks often find it difficult to carry out field studies 
(Gilbert 2002b). We shall therefore expand on the methodological aspects of our work before 
briefly presenting a sample of cases analysed. Our results will characterise the nuclear safety 
expertise activity by comparing the case studies with the other models presented. The analysis 
will conclude with a section devoted to the effectiveness of the expertise studied. 
                                                                                                                                                   
de radioprotection, de contrôle et de sécurité nucléaire : la longue marche vers l'indépendance 
et la transparence.). Other variables also seem to influence the operation of these bodies, like 
the number of plant-operators; the presence of some fifty producers of electricity in the 
United States, in contrast to the monopoly in France, has a notable influence on the 
relationships between regulators and regulated (see Rees, J. V. (1994). Hostages of each other 
: the transformation of nuclear safety since Three Mile Island. Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press.) 
3
 The terms control and regulation have an equivalent meaning here. However, whereas 
researchers into management tend to use the term control, economists and political scientists 
talk more of regulation. 
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EXPERTISE AND CONTROL ACTIVITY MODELS 
Several types of actors are involved in the organisation of nuclear safety in France: 
nuclear plant operators, the front line for the safety of their facilities; representatives of the 
Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) which controls these facilities; experts from the Institute for 
Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) commissioned by ASN to perform expert 
assessments. Nuclear safety expertise is therefore part of a control system. We shall thus 
present several forms of control and a regulation theory known as capture in addition to three 
expertise activity models. 
The expertise canonical model 
The judicial institutions rapidly brought in experts; thus "Roman law permits recourse 
to experts when know-how is required: the expert is approached to measure and assess." 
(Leclerc 2005)(27). This long history helps explain the maturation of organisation principles 
of the judicial expertise in our canonical model. We have taken them from the study by 
Olivier Leclerc (2005). 
"The expert assessment stands out as a measure whereby specific knowledge is made 
available to a judge responsible for resolving a dispute. Thus, the expert assessment fulfils a 
decision aid function: the expert provides the judge with factual elements which he integrates 
in the decision process." (2005)(67). This division of roles is justified by the syllogistical 
structure of the judicial reasoning: "The major premise is the applicable rule of law, the minor 
covers the facts that must be held as constant and which form one or more conditions required 
to apply the rule of law. The conclusion of the syllogism is then drawn." (8). This theory 
ensures the independence of the judge and the expert. 
The French judicial system has the particular feature of pre-selecting experts who will 
be named by the judge; the lists of approved experts held by the jurisdictions are "the central 
expert selection tool in French law." (200). "The competence of the expert is guaranteed by 
his being included in the list of experts and by his knowledge being certified before the 
hearing even gets under way. When he takes part in the hearing, the question of his 
competence is already dealt with." (253). This list system assumes 1) the transcendence of the 
knowledge with respect to the expert - as each expert can be replaced by another expert 
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registered on the same list; 2) the exteriority of the expert's learning process compared with 
the expert assessment process. 
To complete our canonical model, let us evoke the sequence of an ideal expert 
assessment process: the expert, who has an exhaustive library of pre-established bodies of 
knowledge, is asked by the judge to reply to a question. He must therefore compile data, for 
which he enjoys tremendous freedom of action. He exploits these data by traditional, 
deductive reasoning and answers the judge. This marks the end of the expert assessment, 
which seems a relatively solitary process. When several experts are called as witnesses by the 
judge they are not expected to collaborate; each one submits his recommendations to the 
judge based on a succession of individual actions. 
We can formulate nine proposals with these pronouncements which characterise the 
canonical model we are using as our basis (see frame 1).  
E1. The judge instructs the expert to supplement the knowledge required for the 
verdict. 
E2. The expert's intervention is restricted to the facts. 
E3. The expert provides no legal appraisal. 
E4. The expert's knowledge transcends the expert himself. 
E5. The expert's learning processes are independent of the expert assessment process. 
E6. The bodies of knowledge consist of a series of pre-established pronouncements 
and know-how combined with a set of specific data retrieved by the expert. 
E7. The expert is free to decide on the operating modes he uses to answer the judge's 
question. 
E8. The expert assessment process is individual. 
E9. The expert's intervention is isolated and does not continue once the verdict has 
been given. 
Frame 1: Nine proposals for the canonical expertise model 
Criticism of the canonical model and the two alternative models 
Certain proposals featured in the canonical model are fiercely criticised by Olivier 
Leclerc, especially E2 and E3. Based on reflections from the philosophy of law and 
knowledge, he asserts that the expert must of necessity consider the facts in a legal light; the 
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expert cannot be limited to the domain of factuality, itself also defined from categories of law. 
The syllogistical structure of the expert-judge relationship must therefore be revised and the 
normative function of the expert acknowledged. 
The two alternative models below are taken from a review paper by Pierre Benoît Joly 
(2005). They are the result of research into politically-oriented scientific expertise by 
sociologists, political scientists and lawyers from the 1980s onwards, an era marked by a 
succession of health and industrial crises which severely undermined the trust placed by the 
man in the street in scientific expertise. 
The first model emphasises the proceduralisation of expertise, intended to guarantee 
the principles of transparency and independence and the adversarial principle (Hermitte 1997; 
Roqueplo 1997; Decrop and Galland 1998; Godard 2003; Noiville 2003). The characteristic 
proposals of this model, qualified as procedural, are presented in frame 2. 
E’1. Procedures guaranteeing the independence of the expert. 
E’2. Procedures guaranteeing the transparency of the expert assessment process. 
E’3. Procedures used to organise adversarial debates and ensure the expression of 
different theses. 
Frame 2: Three proposals characterising the procedural expert assessment model 
The second model raises more radical doubts over the traditional representations of the 
expert, which give him more a role of mediator between science and politics. It is based on 
the hybrid forum concept suggested by Michel Callon and Arie Rip (1992), intended to 
designate the heterogeneity of situations, constraints and demands faced by the scientists and 
the intangible nature of the science/policy division. This is "seeking a compromise or in what 
is more accurately termed a matching of positions" (146) which they believe characterises the 
activity of experts; "the expert assessment produces an assembly of heterogeneous elements 
considered sufficiently robust to have a certain stability" (147). Two characteristic proposals 
for this model are recorded in frame 3. 
E’’1. To formulate an opinion, the expert uses bodies of scientific knowledge, but he 
also considers economic, socio-political and regulatory constraints. 
E’’2. The process culminating in the formulation of the expert's opinion is made up of 
negotiations aiming at establishing a compromise, at "matching" the various stakeholders 
in sufficiently stable positions. 
Frame 3: Two proposals characterising the hybrid forum model 
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Control forms 
We have chosen here the work of William Ouchi (1979) from the many works about 
control; he has highlighted several control mechanisms in force in organisations. He 
distinguishes between three ideal-types of mechanism, the market (price control), bureaucracy 
(rule-based control) and a clan (tradition-based control). How then is a control form, hybrid if 
necessary, designed? "The essential element which underlies any bureaucratic or market form 
of control is the assumption that it is feasible to measure, with reasonable precision, the 
performance that it is desired. (…) The ability to measure either output or behaviour which is 
relevant to the desired performance is critical to the ‘rational’ application of market and 
bureaucratic forms of control." (843). The only possible form of control when results cannot 
be measured or rules of behaviour defined is clan control. Ouchi illustrates this situation using 
a research laboratory as an example: "the organization relies heavily on ritualized, ceremonial 
forms of control. These include the recruitment of only a selected few individuals, each of 
whom has been through a schooling and professionalization process which has taught him or 
her to internalize the desired values and to revere the appropriate ceremonies."(844). The 
resulting control forms are given in table 1. 
  
Knowledge of rules used to achieve the results 
  
Perfect Imperfect 
High 
Control by the result or by 
conforming to the rules 
Control by the result 
Ability to 
measure the 
results 
Low 
Control by conforming to the rules Clan control (control of skill 
levels) 
Table 1: Control forms (adapted from Ouchi 1979) 
 What forms of risk and reliability control? 
Applying Ouchi's reflections to nuclear risk control therefore requires prior answers to 
the following two questions: can the results associated with a safety production process be 
measured? Are the rules to achieve these results known? 
The safety definitions proposed by Karl Weick then Erik Hollnagel suggest not: safety 
is a "dynamic non-event" (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001)(33); "safety is the sum of accidents that 
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do not occur" (Hollnagel 2006)(9). The words pronounced by an ASN engineer perhaps carry 
more weight: 
"Ultimately, safety takes many forms and is difficult to measure. We surf over this 
difficulty: we tell EDF we want more, without really knowing what it is." [Meeting on 13 
February 2006] 
We must therefore expect to see clan control forms if we follow Ouchi. The scientific 
literature and witness accounts from industrialists nevertheless seem to identify others. 
Researchers who have studied the high reliability organisations, particularly in the 
nuclear (Bourrier 1999; Journé 1999), chemical (Colmellere 2008) and aeronautical 
(Amalberti 2001) fields have all noted the high (too many) number of procedures
4
. These 
sectors seem henceforth to be characterised by the dominance of a safety strategy based on 
anticipating at-risk situations (Wildavsky 1988; Journé 1999). In the nuclear industry, this is 
apparent through the extended use of notions of defence-in-depth and barrier and by the 
presence of a bureaucratic-type control (compliance with procedures, checking for barriers, 
requesting extra barriers). 
In addition, nuclear power plant operators advertise widely the interest they have in 
operating experience, designated by the French three-letter code REX
5
 and covering 
procedures for feeding back information in the event of an incident, triggering an analysis and 
processing statistics. These procedures are used in particular to account for the number of 
incidents and produce indicators for use as a form of control by results. 
Our empirical data should therefore illustrate the composite nature of the nuclear risk 
control activity. 
Capture theory 
In the 1970s, American economists and political scientists (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 
1980; Bardach and Kagan 1982) focused their studies on situations of public risk control. 
They introduced the notion of capture into the heart of their analyses, adopted under the 
public debates on deregulation in the United States. 
                                                
4
 An EDF representative stated during a conference that a nuclear power plant was governed 
by 30,000 procedures! 
5
 The three-letter code means « Retour d’expérience ». 
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The theory of capture is based on a simple observation: compliance with the 
requirements of the regulator costs the company money. The company therefore has every 
interest in persuading the regulator to tone down his system of rules. When this happens the 
regulator is captured; he champions the company's cause and the regulatory system is 
corrupted.  
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) have moderated this conclusion. They believe that the 
regulator can also win by collaborating and thus distinguishing between effective and 
ineffective captures. This is in fact a positive form of capture identified by La Porte and 
Thomas (1995) when studying the relations between the inspectors and the personnel of an 
American nuclear power plant. 
The analysis grids we have used to interpret our field data are based on the various 
expertise models, the control forms and the notion of capture. 
CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
We have compiled data on the activity of experts via a research-intervention
6
 
(Moisdon 1984; Hatchuel and Molet 1986; David 2000). Immersion is another possible term 
given the frequency and intensity of interactions between the researcher and the organisation's 
representatives. We have spent more than three years in the heart of a team made up of some 
ten experts. The purpose of the research-intervention, defined from the start of the 
collaboration, was to end up with a definition of the effectiveness of expert assessments 
produced by the team. The research should be the result of rigorous monitoring by the 
researcher of several files produced by the experts. In accordance with the research-
intervention methodological requirements (Girin 1987), progress was presented regularly to 
the experts in a steering committee and to the management researchers. 
We detail below the context elements used to situate the questions and research 
results. 
                                                
6
 Also known as « collaborative research » (see Adler, N., A. B. R. Shani, et al. (2004). 
Collaborative research in organizations. Foundations for learning, change, and theoritical 
development, Sage Publications.; Shani, A. B. R., S. A. Mohrman, et al. (2007). Handbook of 
collaborative management research, Sage Publications.) 
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A team of human factor specialists 
The experts at the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety who we 
came into contact with are human factor (HF) specialists, mainly trained in ergonomics, 
sometimes in sociology and management
7
. This speciality has emerged in the nuclear sector 
as a direct consequence of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Until then, safety experts 
focused on the design stage of nuclear facilities. Analyses of Three Mile Island showed the 
need to take account of working conditions for teams in the operations phase. Thus, in the 
early 1980s, the nuclear operators and safety institutions started welcoming HF specialists. 
Initially focusing on the design of man-machine interfaces, procedures and training 
programmes, HF expertise has gradually incorporated organisational safety factors (Rolina 
2006), highlighted in particular by several surveys following resounding accidents (Reason 
1987; Shrivastava 1987; Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Paté-Cornell 1990; Vaughan 1990; 
Perrow 1999). 
Emmanuel Plot's recent work (2007) lists most of the HF issues. The author 
emphasises the problems of coordination, role definition and responsibilities, communication 
and decision-making modalities as had representatives of the high-reliability organisation 
group before him, who raised a series of criteria intended to characterise their high reliability 
(Rochlin 2001). However, researchers refuse to recommend an organisation model (Bourrier 
1999); there is no denying that the corpus of bodies of positive knowledge as a basis for 
designing a safe organisation is far from complete. As Journé wrote about reliability criteria, 
"we have rather a succession of isolated elucidations." (1999)(71). These apparent gaps in 
knowledge prompt us to analyse how they are constituted in the context of expert 
assessments. 
The institutional context of expertise 
The activity of the IRSN HF specialists is part of an institutional architecture that has 
given rise to extensive criticism. In line of sight, the lack of any adversarial public debate, of 
                                                
7
 This made the research far easier as ergonomists are particularly aware of the value of 
intervention (see for example Guérin, F., A. Laville, et al. (1997). Comprendre le travail pour 
le transformer. La pratique de l'ergonomie. Lyon, Editions de l'ANACT, Martin, C. and D. 
Baradat (2003). Des pratiques en réflexion. Dix ans de débat sur l'intervention ergonomique. 
Toulouse, Octarès Editions.) 
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any "nuclear law" (before 2006), the denunciation of a "phenomenon of expertise being 
monopolised by the promoters of technology" (Roqueplo 1995). This criticism, making the 
question of independence of experts and their eventual capture by industrialists essential, 
seems nevertheless attenuated by recent institutional transformations. In any case, this is the 
opinion of Claude Gilbert, a political scientist specialising in risk and crisis management: 
"This change comes from the clear dissociation gradually separating the organisations directly 
in charge of at-risk activities from the control authorities and expert assessment structures. 
(…). Thus, all the nuclear-related activities are viewed from two perspectives (…)" (2002a) 
(464). This movement towards expertise autonomy is accompanied by its proceduralisation 
and should therefore illustrate the relevance of the procedural model in analysing our 
material. 
The various cases and type of data compiled 
In conjunction with the HF specialists, we have selected a sample of three contrasting 
expert assessments. The first was devoted to reviewing the safety of an experimental reactor, 
the second to analysing several incidents occurring in an R&D laboratory and the third to the 
skills management of operating personnel in several nuclear power plants. Between March 
2005 and September 2006, we attended some twenty meetings between the experts, plant 
operators and ASN representatives, carried out about fifty interviews with them and examined 
over a hundred documents. 
We used this material to situate nuclear safety expertise in the HF field in relation to 
various expertise and control models. 
NUCLEAR SAFETY EXPERTISE TESTED BY MODELS 
We shall see that the data compiled only inadequately fit the models presented, which 
are deliberately vague about essential characteristics of nuclear safety expertise. 
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The expert's referral 
The expertise start point nevertheless conforms in certain aspects to the canonical 
model. In the institutional context of nuclear safety, ASN acts as the judge and instructs the 
expert. The ASN representative needs the skills of the expert to pronounce on a specific 
question. This situation is illustrated in two of the case studies: 
"We have the impression that experimenters take many liberties. Is it their fault for all 
that? I don't know. This is why I want an expert assessment". ["Incident analysis" expert 
assessment. Interview with an ASN representative (29/11/05)] 
"Do central departments have the means of ensuring that people are skilled? This is the 
central issue of expertise. ["Skills management" expert assessment. Interview with an 
ASN representative (19/04/06)] 
The reason for referral is different in the third case. A facility has been operating for 
ten years and ASN requests the plant operator to carry out a safety review. Once completed, it 
requests the IRSN experts to assess the work of the plant operator. This is automatically 
referred to a HF specialist to assess whether human factors have been taken into account in 
this safety review. 
Generally speaking, following the referral by ASN and before the investigation 
commences, a major stage can be noted, during which the experts, in conjunction with the 
ASN representatives, specify the questions and methods for their investigation. This was 
especially the case for the skills management, where an analysis of the literature and several 
incidents identified the key phases in the skills management process to be analysed and the 
trades for which 360-degree interviews were decided.  
The configuration here differs fairly comprehensively from that of the canonical 
model, where the judge expects an answer from the expert to a set question. 
Once explained, the subjects of the analysis and expertise methods were presented to 
the plant operator. 
Expert-plant operator negotiations 
This first expert-plant operator interaction is nevertheless not restricted to a 
presentation. In two of the case studies, the plant operator vigorously discussed the relevance 
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of the expert's questions and methods. Thus, in the safety review, the plant operator did not 
agree to the HF specialist interviewing the operating personnel. The specialists were luckier 
for the skills management: 
"We were afraid of their reaction to our insistence on the need for field work but they did 
not disagree." ["Skills management" expert assessment. Interview with the HF specialist 
(29/06/05)] 
However, the expert assessment subjects were negotiated furiously: 
"We wanted to take the human resources policy into account more to assess the skills 
management. The plant operator did not agree, arguing that this area was off the 
subject." ["Skills management" expert assessment. Interview with the HF specialist 
(29/06/05)] 
Other negotiations met with more success; 
"The plant operator reacted violently when we asked for documents on recruitment and 
redeployment [internal mobility]. They felt this was out of the frame. They justified their 
fear by invoking a sensitive social context. We fought over this point and finally they gave 
in." ["Skills management" expert assessment. ». Interview with the HF specialist 
(29/06/05)] 
These negotiations with the plant operator prior to the expert assessment itself 
invalidates proposal E7 in the canonical model, which stipulated that the expert was free to 
choose the operating procedures. Here the experts need to access the field. And to achieve 
this, the plant operator has to be convinced that the approach is relevant. 
At the end of the expertise process, the results in the form of draft recommendations 
are also discussed with the plant operator. This was particularly true of the safety review: 
- HF specialist: do you agree with our draft recommendations? 
- plant operator: we agree with the first recommendation, but it is difficult to produce an 
operating record for an organisation, so we'll give you some elements of operating 
feedback, OK? We agree with the second recommendation but with a delay of eighteen 
months. Do you agree? 
- HF specialist: OK. We agree. ["Safety review" expert assessment. Experts-plant 
operators meeting (02/02/06)] 
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The negotiating nature of this expertise process partially validates proposal E’’2, 
thereby bringing it closer to the hybrid forum model. However, in the cases presented here, it 
is not just the result of the expert assessment that is negotiated, as access to the bodies of 
knowledge is also at stake. 
The expert's bodies of knowledge 
The analysis of various cases invalidates the representation of bodies of knowledge 
that is a feature of the canonical expertise model. It is noted that the specialists have little 
recourse to a library of pre-established bodies of knowledge, a library also acknowledged as 
incomplete; the bodies of knowledge in fact are built up during the expertise process. Thus, 
several themes assessed under the safety review have emerged from meetings with the plant 
operator and in the incident analysis the specialist identified gaps in workstation ergonomics 
during a visit to the facility, for example : 
"The labels are really not that easy to make out. You also have to be to the far left of the 
port whereas the pipes can only be connected using the right-hand remote handler."
8
 
["Incident analysis" expert assessment. Discussion with the HF specialist during the 
assessment (18/06/06)] 
Having said that, not all the necessary bodies of knowledge come from the current 
expert assessment. To perform an assessment, it is also important to master prerequisites 
relating to the institutional operation. Thus, in the skills management case, service providers 
taking part in the expert assessment under the supervision of the HF specialist and who had 
never worked in the nuclear sector were in trouble. 
"To write an assessment report means acquiring a vocabulary and ways of expressing 
yourself which demands a certain experience in the nuclear sector. And then there's a 
whole set of mechanics governing the relations between the expert and the plant operator 
which is not easy to grasp. ["Skills management" expert assessment. Interview with the 
HF specialist (25/05/06)] 
Contrary to proposal E5, it is clear that the expert's learning processes are far from 
independent from the expertise processes; without necessarily using pre-established bodies of 
                                                
8
 After this observation, the specialist requested an ergonomic study on all the facility's 
workstations. 
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knowledge, the expert builds up his bodies of knowledge by interacting with the plant 
operator and learns how best to comply with the institutional requirements. The methodology 
used by the expert is not therefore identified by a simple compilation of data; it relies far more 
on an "epistemology of interaction". 
This result, combined with the negotiating nature of the expert assessment, fully 
invalidates proposal E4, where the expert's body of knowledge transcends the expert himself. 
The collective aspects of the expert assessment can however reduce its "expert-dependence". 
Collective and procedural expertise 
The collective nature of nuclear safety expertise, which invalidates proposal E8, has 
several dimensions. The issues relating to expert-ASN and expert-plant operator relationships 
have already been discussed. In addition, our data has revealed the importance of horizontal 
and vertical relationships within IRSN. 
The hierarchical relationships become particularly clear when the draft report is being 
validated. The many reviews within the Institute form a system intended to control the 
contingent aspects of the assessment process and reduce the "expert-dependence" of the 
expertise. 
Coordination between the various specialists is also a decisive ingredient of the 
assessment production process. For example, in the safety review, no fewer than thirteen 
experts representing all special aspects of nuclear safety were mobilised. For the incident 
analysis, the HF specialist was able to collaborate with one colleague who knew the facility 
particularly well: 
"He reviewed and corrected all the questionnaires I sent to the plant operator and 
explained the facility's operation and organisation to me. His questions helped me 
enormously when I visited the facility. ["Incident analysis" expert assessment. Interview 
with the HF specialist (28/11/05)] 
The collective aspects of the expertise are orchestrated by the Institute's procedures 
which include in particular the adversarial principle (E’3), as is illustrated by one of the 
maxims well-known to experts: 
"At the end of the process, the expert and the plant operator must agree on the points of 
disagreement". 
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In a word, the canonical model proves totally unsuitable for interpreting our data. In 
addition, whereas nuclear safety expertise illustrates certain of the proposed alternative 
models, fundamental aspects of cases analysed - the negotiating nature, the "interactive 
epistemology" as the basis for constituting bodies of knowledge - are ignored. Let us now turn 
to how the control and capture theories face up to reality. 
The multiple control forms 
A few of the expertise situations can be interpreted in the light of the Ouchi conceptual 
framework. 
The three case studies have confirmed the presence of a control by procedures. Thus, 
in the context of skills management, the HF specialists were particularly interested in the 
existence of management systems. 
"We are interested in the skills management system, its own systems, its procedures and 
their implementation; we wish to answer the question "does the plant operator have the 
means to assess and manage the skills?". We are not directly concerned with operator 
skills." ["Skills management" expert assessment. HF specialist during a meeting 
(14/03/06)] 
For the safety review, the HF specialist noted the lack of formalisation of the operating 
experience and questioned the plant operator on how the facility's operational documentation 
was validated and how many days were set aside to train operators in a certain type of risk. In 
general terms, it is accepted that these procedures, these human or organisational factors 
represent barriers. When the specialist finds a barrier missing, he can ask the plant operator to 
add it. Thus, in the safety review, the specialist asked the plant operator to formalise the 
operating experience and assess his reorganisation, on the assumption that this would have 
positive effects on the safety. 
In this same case, this control form was not the only one noted. The specialist sought 
to assess the skill level of individuals involved in the plant operator's diagnosis. He was 
reassured by the plant operator:  
"It's a company you have already worked with, HF specialists, who carried out this 
diagnosis." ["Safety review" expert assessment. The plant operator during a meeting with 
the expert (09/06/05)] 
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The control by result was less apparent, even if the occurrence of several incidents in a 
facility justified launching an expert assessment and an analysis of a few incidents was used 
in the safety review. 
The Ouchi control forms are nevertheless deliberately vague about a major expertise 
operation. In all three cases, the HF specialists focused on an investigation intended to 
understand the chains of event likely to lead to an incident. Thus, for the skills management, 
analysing the operator activity and a hundred or so interviews took place over several weeks. 
For the safety review, the specialist analysed a fuel loading operation during which he 
considered at-risk cases and listed the barriers. The incident analysis is the best illustration of 
an exercise of this type, for it aims in particular to reconstitute at a later date chains of events 
that have actually led to an incident. 
Although this stage is tricky and costly - we have seen that field access had to be 
negotiated -, it improves the assessment of links between the HF and safety and therefore the 
effectiveness of barriers. This is an essential dimension; many authors have underlined the 
unproductive nature of barriers when there are too many of them (Journé 1999; Amalberti 
2001; Hollnagel 2004). It is therefore right that the expert assessment is not restricted to a 
control of procedures and barriers which ends up increasing their numbers, but that it 
incorporates this investigation stage with its wealth of learning that may well identify the 
most effective barriers. 
Is the expert captured? 
It is difficult to answer this question unreservedly. We have emphasised the 
unavoidable negotiations with the operator which may put constraints on the expert 
assessment. Nevertheless, once the data had been compiled, the experts clearly developed and 
formulated their judgements independently - sometimes resulting in caustic exchanges with 
the plant operator - in all cases.  
In addition, negotiations with the plant operator can have a positive effect on the 
expert assessment. We have seen that the plant operator can make the expert's work easier, 
above all when he wishes to use the assessment results. This was the case for the skills 
management: 
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"I wish our work to be useful to you, which is why I have selected the sites and discussed 
the trades to be used in compiling data. ["Skills management" expert assessment. 
Interview with the plant operator (07/12/05)] 
Some of the conclusions of the incident analysis were also welcomed by the plant 
operator: 
"I think that an ergonomic analysis of workstations is a good idea, even if it will be 
difficult to implement. I am also for boosting the safety team numbers. ["Incident 
analysis" expert assessment. Interview with the plant operator (07/07/06)] 
The interest shown by the plant operator in the expert assessment can resemble a form 
of capture, with the expert in a way carrying out work on behalf of the plant operator. 
Although this may bother the supporter of independence
9
, it is positive capture as it helps 
ensure better application of the assessment conclusions, thereby improving the operating 
dimension of its effectiveness. We wish to end this account by explaining the various types of 
expertise effectiveness. 
CONCLUSION: HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE EXPERT SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT? 
Although it is important to detail, as we have just done, the expertise production 
process to be able to discuss its effectiveness, it is equally important to list the various 
products. The first is the expert assessment report which involves extensive work in matching 
the players and which falls within the remit of the main requester, ASN. The process must 
respect the quality, deadline and cost constraints and produce persuasive arguments despite 
the lack of certainties available in the HF field. Adhering to the expert's recommendations 
ensures their correct application. This application, and more generally all the concrete 
modifications to the facility and procedures triggered by the expert assessment are the second 
product. Lastly, we have identified expertise as a learning process, unlike one of the proposals 
                                                
9
 In other fields, several authors, including Olivier Godard, have highlighted idle fancies 
conveying this notion: "The independent expert, the soldier monk of the Republic, disunited 
from all things and all interests, but capable of accessing the body of knowledge without any 
kind of bias, does not exist. It is not the independence of experts you need to aim at but the 
independence of the expertise collectively handed down. This is even more true when the 
independence equates to the position of the dissenter." (2003)(10) 
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in the canonical model; the bodies of knowledge resulting from this process are the third 
expertise product.  
A type of effectiveness can be associated with each of these products. The table 2 
groups several effectiveness criteria identified by our investigations. 
Product Type of effectiveness Effectiveness criteria 
Expert 
assessment 
report 
Rhetorical effectiveness 
Matching experts, the hierarchy, plant operation adhesion, 
ASN satisfaction, etc. 
Actions Operating effectiveness 
Modified procedure, more specific documentation, 
"concealed" effects ("safety culture building"), etc. 
Bodies of 
knowledge 
Cognitive effectiveness 
At-risk activity analysis controlled better, new barriers 
identified. Publication of work, etc. 
Table 2: The three types of HF expertise effectiveness 
This analysis suggests improvement paths for the experts: increase the number of 
interactions between the specialists and their colleagues prior to the review to improve 
rhetorical effectiveness; encourage contacts with the ASN controllers to improve operating 
effectiveness; write a note on the lessons learned by the specialist following the expert 
assessment to improve cognitive effectiveness. It also seems that it can be transposed to other 
institutional configurations and other industrial risks (particularly aeronautical and 
chemical).
10
 
                                                
10
 We wish to thank the experts at the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety 
most sincerely for their welcome and cooperation. 
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